Christopher R. Vaccaro

Law students studying real property law encounter the doctrine of adverse possession. According to this doctrine, known colloquially as “squatter’s rights,” if a person holds open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious possession of land for several years, that person becomes the legal owner of the land, without a written deed from the record owner.

The statutory period for securing ownership by adverse possession in Massachusetts is 20 years, but if the land is registered with the Land Court it cannot be claimed by adverse possession no matter how long a squatter possesses it. Many adverse possession cases involve small parcels of land surrounded by encroaching fences, but last year in Paine v. Sexton the Massachusetts Appeals Court awarded 36 acres to an adverse possessor on Cape Cod.

The Paine family had operated a commercial campground in Wellfleet since 1958. They built roadways, cleared campsites and maintained recreational facilities and other amenities for campers. They posted “no trespassing” signs throughout the property and controlled access to it, but they did not fence or cultivate the entire area. The Paines had also obtained written deeds covering some of the property, but the chain of title behind those deeds and the property descriptions were defective.

The Paines sought to register the property in Land Court with themselves as owners. David and Chellise Sexton took issue, and the litigation was on.

The Paines’ claim was twofold. First, they argued that their control of the campground for over 50 years established their ownership by adverse possession. Second, they maintained that the deeds transferring portions of the property to them, though flawed, supported their ownership under the “color of title” doctrine. This doctrine applies where adverse possessors have actual deeds describing the property, but the deeds are defective. Under those circumstances, adverse possessors can claim ownership of the entire property described in their defective deeds, even though they do not occupy all of it.

The Sextons countered that the Paines could not claim ownership by adverse possession because they had not enclosed the land with fencing or cultivated it. The Sextons also argued, with the support of expert testimony, that the property descriptions in the deeds were so poor that they “could not be located on the ground in any circumstances.”

The Land Court handled the case in two stages. First, it held a trial where it determined that the Paines owned portions of the land that they physically occupied. In reaching this determination, the Land Court judge viewed the site during the camping season to better understand the extent of the Paines’ occupation. Second, the Land Court ruled by summary judgment, without a trial, that the Paines owned the land described in their deeds under color of title, rejecting the Sextons’ expert testimony that the deed descriptions were incomprehensible. The Sextons appealed.

The Appeals Court noted the extent of the Paines’ seasonal campground operation on the property, while recognizing the lack of fencing and cultivation. The court acknowledged that for “wild or woodland” properties, adverse possessors must show sufficient use of the property to make lawful landowners aware of their presence. After reviewing the record, the court upheld the Land Court judge’s ruling that the Paines owned the property occupied by their campground through adverse possession.

Turning next to the color of title claim, the court noted that the Paines’ deeds described the properties by references to assessor’s maps, and sometimes by supplemental metes and bounds descriptions. The court upheld the Land Court judge’s decision awarding the Paines title to the property described in the defective deeds, despite the Sextons’ contradictory expert opinions. However, the court noted that further proceedings in Land Court were needed to determine proper boundaries, before the property could be registered to the Paines.

Every adverse possession case is unique. It is difficult to give general advice to property owners about this doctrine based on Paine v. Sexton, other than to warn that if they are walking about their property and they notice a commercial campground on it, they should promptly take issue with the campground operator instead of waiting 50 years to do so. 

Christopher R. Vaccaro is a partner at Dalton & Finegold in Andover. His email address is cvaccaro@dfllp.com.